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aletheia as the truth of being itself. If there exists some original covering of aletheia, it follows that such a dissimulation extends to the manner in which being is represented. It is this manner of representation which might be described in terms style.
Derrida emphasizes that style expresses the intimate connection of being to the representation of being. It is on the basis of this assertion that he calls into question the manner in which Heidegger, despite numerous and remarkable insights, discounts certain problematics of style in his extensive engagement with Nietzsche's Twilight of the Gods. In particular, Derrida contends that Heidegger's decision to analyse "all the elements of Nietzsche's text with the sole exception of the idea's becoming-female" 6 in certain aphorisms, fails fully to recognize the ontological significance of style.
Derrida is adamant that stylistic particularity not be reduced to a metaphorical peculiarity, 7 yet to resist such a reduction it is necessary simultaneously to radicalize the connection of style to identity, 8 and to press style to a point beyond identity where it has an existential momentum of its own.
It is largely to the latter task that the present work addresses itself, drawing its momentum from the central proposition of Spurs: if style, as dissimulation, did not mediate between essence and the simulation of essence, then essence would be absolutely irretrievable, and all that would remain would be simulation. 9 Style veils essence from appearance through an archaic dissimulation which raises the possibility that objects, as they appear, "might only be pretending to be simulating" 10 a withdrawn essence: "[i]ts secret is...the possibility that indeed it might have no secret."
11
The extent to which style appears to effect an occultation of reality reflects not a radical inconsistency within reality itself, but occurs on account of the historical rift which forces apart the immanence of the real from the means by which such immanence is presented. 12 Thus, to clarify the logic of style is to facilitate, rather than hinder, access to the facticity of the real. In Writing Degree 6 Ibid., 85. 7 Ibid., 87. 8 This seems to be a principal strategy adopted by Derrida in Spurs (Ibid., 95-7, 103-5). 9 Derrida phrases the case as follows: "'Truth' can only be a surface. But the blushing movement of that truth which is not suspended in quotation marks casts a modest veil over such a surface...But should that veil be suspended, or even fall a bit differently, there would not longer be any truth, only 'truth' -written in quotation marks" (Ibid., 59). 10 Ibid., 133. 11 Ibid. 12 In a remarkable footnote (Jacques Derrida, "The Double Session," Dissemination, trans. In this way, style concretises the tension between concealment and revelation, a concreteness which is nowhere more apparent than in the field of aesthetic production. In the artwork, style is clearly distributed between the conception, production, material existence, perception and interpretation of the work. If expressive style is an aggregation of these positions, such aggregation is nonetheless nonsummative -a term which will be accorded some significance in the argument which follows.
Style is at once pervasive and evasive; it is recognized, felt, and responded to. Yet, in itself, style resists precise definition, taking shape "in the interval between several styles."
14
It is perhaps for this reason that it becomes necessary to trace the passage between expressive style and ontological style, and in so doing to move from one level of description to another. The present contention is that the distinction of expressive style from ontological style is symbolized in Spurs as the difference between the mask and the veil. 15 The mask -habitually worn by the quasi-heroic figures of the artist and the philosopher 16 -involves a "reactive dissimulation" 17 which bars art from presenting reality by emphasizing the artificiality of the artwork. However, it is also possible to imagine artworks in which the logic of presentation is one of veiling, of an "affirmative dissimulation" 18 which acts as a sign or an oblique presentation of aletheia -the as yet unpresented existential truth of reality.
Seeming is Being: The Convergence of Expressive Style and Ontological Style
The problem of style haunts the entire history of mimesis, mediating between the mask and the veil;
between an essential concealment -a sign for the irretrievability of essence -and the process of unconcealment -reality laid bare without any form of dissimulation. In Derrida's estimation, it is than the singularity of the work itself, 26 yet is inextricable from the work precisely to the extent that it reflects this privative part of the creative process which connects the aesthetic object to an individual who generates it, if not necessarily to the society within which the work will discover its significance.
27
The untimely artist -who steps away from contemporaneity -is the one whose work imagines the point which concerns the present work, the point at which expressive style and ontological style, the veil and that which lies beneath the veil, are indistinguishable from one another. When an artwork no longer reflects a distinction between presentation and representation, except in terms of a minimal difference or an "interval between several styles," 28 it becomes plausible to claim that art simultaneously instantiates and clarifies the real. For such an art, style is matter -a claim which constitute an "article of artistic faith," 29 and which testifies to "the inseparability of manner and Plato's suspicion "of art as mere appearance is not based on the hypothesis of its immateriality but precisely the opposite: its irreducible materiality. Plato fears that the effects produced by the work of art will escape the control of the determining form." 35 Similarly, in "The Double Session," Derrida stresses that "Plato, far from linking the destiny of art and poetry to the structure of mimesis…disqualifies in mimesis everything that 'modernity' makes much of: the mask…the simulacrum." 36 It is the stubborn concreteness of mimesis which constitutes its threat, since it is n a strict material sense it is the Plato's view.
What might this mean with respect to the contention that style is matter? In the first instance, it is of considerable significance that poetry should prove the appropriate medium for demonstrating that the force of seeming, of the simulacrum, is nothing other than an instantiation of being. It is the poets, after all, who are subject to Plato's most intense scrutiny, precisely because poiesis names a force through which something real is produced. As it is used in this fragment from Stevens' poem, seeming effects a field of continuity between appearance and essence ("What it seems/it is"), a continuity which itself distinguishes an element universal to being ("and in such seeming all things are"). Indeed, when Derrida refers to "the remainder of the simulacrum which has been left in writing," 37 does he not identify the intimate element of this ontological continuity? At the same 30 Ibid. Although Leland de la Durantaye examines style in a far more restricted sense than the present work, and focuses on the work of Nabakov, his study ends with a number of memorable and strikingly applicable turns of phrase. the dissimulation of essence which, with respect to the representation of being, constitutes an ontological style.
Thus, to suggest that there exists a point at which expressive style and ontological style are indistinguishable, is effectively to imagine the aesthetic situation in which seeming is being. In such cases, where dissimulation is most intense, style becomes reality. The ominous overtones of such a claim echo across the history of thought from Plato to Schmitt, but, as in the case of Baudrillard's hyperreality, installing style in ontological pride of place invariably overreaches itself. For, finally, if the real describes the pervasive condition of every possible reality, it means that style intensifies rather than dissimulates the real. Accepting that style is most clearly problematized in art, this intensification is equally evident in artworks which exist nonreferentially, as it is in those which selfreflexively call attention to their artificiality or to their mimetic fidelity.
Simultaneously weaving and penetrating the veil which separates seeming from being, 39 style marks an acute problematization of the connection between the artwork and reality. In this aspect, it is not a question of maintaining that style is a sufficient ground for the constitution of reality, but rather of recognizing that style always presents itself in terms of a relationship to the real. Mediating the intensity of our encounter with the real, style defines our comportment towards reality. 40 In this sense, style serves a radical ontological purpose. To clarify this proposition, the present work pursues this radicalism at the point where the knot of aesthetic realism and ontological realism is at its tightest. This is a point where presence is marked in terms of fundamental quantity, and quantity is translated by a style of counting, a style of relating to quantity itself as the ground of the real. It is the aesthetic logic of minimalism -preoccupied as it is with number, scale, sequences and serieswhich rehearses this style of counting with particular clarity and force. quantitative dimension. Its calculations address the manner in which entities belong to certain sets, sequences and systems. A style of counting measures reality in terms of economic principles of equivalence and exchange, but it also attempts to imagine real entities as contingent unities in the midst of multiplicity. To count is, of course, to calculate, but it is also to participate in an ongoing dispute as to whether it is quantity or quality which underpins being. The wager of the present work is that it is fundamental quantity that grounds being, and so constitutes the field of potentiality from which entities emerge in a manner which constitutes reality. Among the truly ancient questions of philosophy is how best to grasp being itself. The poet-philosopher, Parmenides, whose thought is taken up and developed by Plato, presents this problem in the starkly axiomatic terms with which thought is still attempting to come to grips: is being one or multiple; is it governed by unity or by multiplicity?
Quantitative Style: Responding to Parmenides
According to Alain Badiou, this problem remains unresolved: "the upshot of the aporias in
Parmenides...[reveals that] it is pointless to try to deduce the existence (or non-existence) of the
One: it is necessary to decide [between unity and multiplicity], and then assume the consequences." 41 However, regardless of whether the decision is in favour of unity or of multiplicity, being appears to be unavoidably entangled with questions of quantity. To represent how quantity is immanent to existence is a formidable task. What mathematics renders intelligible, it presents in a style which, for most, remains somewhat abstract. It is for this reason that it is useful, if admittedly reductive, to consider radical quantity in terms of different styles of counting -styles which recognize that unity and multiplicity are seldom easily distinguished from one another, and recalling that style is precisely a problematization of the limit between expression, seeming and being.
A style of counting traces the way in which entities are grouped together and belong to certain sets, entities are assigned particular value, rendered significant, and incorporated into various economies in a manner which makes quantity itself a primary quality of being. 43 To trace a style of counting is not to deny the worrying commitment in contemporary life to accumulation and acquisition. Indeed, to clarify the link between quantity and being may yet produce an effective means of resisting the reduction of existence to a mere set of numbers within the machinations of a global capitalist economy.
44
In this light, the situations and objects which exhibit an aptitude for exemplifying different styles of counting take on a particular significance. Art, in particular, possesses the singular capacity for reflecting and reflecting upon quantitative style, making sensible that aspect of number which all too easily is left in the stratosphere of pure concepts. Artworks realize situations in which vastly different styles and intensities are rendered intelligible in terms of qualitative equivalences and differences.
Yet it is also true that these qualities are aggregated or separated, arranged into sets, systems or sequences, in a manner which precisely reflects different quantitative styles. Quantitative style clarifies the situations in which objects persist, however contingently, as singular calculations of properties, and collections of qualities. In the conceptual framework sketched above, quality does not compete with quantity. Rather, it is subtracted from the absolute multiplicity which simultaneously grounds and constitutes being itself. 45 The account which is given of such processes of existential calculation -for example, whether or not subtraction is seen as negative diminution or recursion, or as positive testament to the inexhaustibility of multiplicity -is what characterizes a particular quantitative style.
Essence Evades Calculation: Addressing Multiplicity
42 With respect to the relation of absolute multiplicity and real infinity, Badiou contends that mathematics proposes "a vertigo of an infinity of infinities distinguishable within their common opposition to the finite" (Alain Badiou, In Spurs, Derrida observes that since essence, or the truth of being, is neither a property of being, nor simply a process of appropriation of properties, it "falls short of the undecidable exchange of more into less." 46 Put simply, essence evades calculation. This evasiveness is clarified in light of two important claims: first, that it is radical quantity which grounds being; and secondly, that it is pure multiplicity which constitutes radical quantity. According to Badiou, being is irreducibly multiple:
he multiple from which ontology makes up its situation is composed solely of multiplicities".
47
Amongst the numerous thinkers who, like Badiou, "seek in some sense to express, intuit, figure or otherwise articulate the multiple," 48 we might count Derrida. 49 However, where Badiou seeks to demonstrate multiplicity by a direct mathematically derived ontology, 50 Derrida pursues multiplicity more obliquely, through a hermeneutic derived from the relation between difference and repetition.
While for Badiou, multiplicity conditions being, and so precedes specific entities or identities, for Derrida, multiplicity is clarified from within the process of identification. Here, then, are two styles of counting. They arrive at a shared affirmation -that being is multiple -yet by paths which reveal different horizons for number and its significance to the real as each conceives it.
Number and mathematics are irregular topics for Derrida. It is clear, nonetheless, that he explores at least two styles of counting: the first is well exemplified in the brief examination of repetition and origin conducted in "Ellipsis," from which can be drawn a general position on counting. This is complimented by "The Supernumerary," the last part of Dissemination, in which Derrida elaborates his resistance to enumeration and calculation more directly. In both cases, number and calculation are viewed as procedural, rather than essential. In a significant sense, a style of counting is all there is to number, for Derrida, which, to some extent, clarifies why he associates number with a reductive regime, and the limitation of being to equivalences, rather than with potentiality. For Badiou, number is eminently real, and constitutes a field from which change can be both drawn and better comprehended. By juxtaposing the quantitative styles of Derrida and Badiou, it becomes clear that to resist the instrumental quantification of being, it is necessary to remain responsive to a range of quantitative styles, and to both their confluences and differences. 
Representing Number: 0 through 9 and the Remainder
Explaining that the singularity of the work resides not solely in the unique way in which its qualities cohere, but also in the capacity of this unique aggregation to be repeated, Derrida offers the following remarkably concise statement regarding his style of counting: "[w]hat we have here is an incalculable scene, because we can't count 1, 2, 3, or the first before the second, a scene which never reveals itself by definition, and whose phenomenality can only disappear." 51 What might at first seem a cryptic claim, is clarified through the realisation that Derrida seeks to demonstrate that existence can only be grasped in terms of contingent intensities, fleeting moments of incomplete identification, rather than in terms of essence.
Deconstruction recognizes that identity is neither a radical or original quantity which precedes instantiation, nor a process of sequential accumulation. Identity, which might be described as the medium through which being renders itself knowable, is dependent on its repeatability. Although repetition involves accumulation -the compounding of iteration upon iteration -each repetition carries with it a difference from the others that precede it, however imperceptible this difference may be. The minimal momentum gathered by identity in this way means that existence is always veering towards multiplicity. Indeed, deconstruction offers itself as the intuition that being is marked by multiplicity rather than unity, but maintains that multiplicity is perceptible only because there is a radical rift which marks every entity as constitutively double -split between an absent and irretrievable point of origin, and the minimal mark of this absence which calls for reiteration and so constitutes a "prosthesis of origin." Identity always issues and answers this call, for it cannot inhabit this split, which always threatens to slip back into the absence it tentatively defies by existing. For this reason, repetition becomes the prerequisite for stabilizing identity. As Derrida contends in "Ellipsis", "[t]here was immediately a double origin plus its repetition. Three is the first figure of repetition."
52
There is an eminently quantitative logic at work here. Identity is never fully present to itself since it is always figured in terms of the repetition of a split -the double, which translates that to inhabit a point of origin is impossible, and so is always a fragmented desire. Thus, where we might expect any entity to offer itself in terms of unity -as one (1) double, in which case, numerically, it appears that two (2) precedes one (1). However, this double origin does not have the capacity for self-presentation, precisely because, as a split, it is the mark of a lack of unified origin. Coherence is granted only through repetition, reiteration, and re-marking this mark of the double. It is for this reason that three (3) -double plus repetition -precedes two (2).
Three (3) is thus the figure of contingent unity (1) -"the first figure of repetition," or prosthesis for the absent unity which, in any event, is merely a myth of origin marked by a split, or a double (2).
In this way, Derrida's quantitative style suggests that, in returning to the Parmenidean axiomatization of being as a decision between the one and the many as soon as it is admitted that being makes itself intelligible in terms of identity, this decision has, in practice, already been made in favour of multiplicity. Grounded only in radical absence which is marked by a split or double origin, identity is unintelligible without repetition. The quantitative logic of deconstruction is triplicate:
three -the double and the repetition -is the number of an identity which resists the force of final identification or unification, maintaining in its iterability a strict nonsummativity, and an openness to the simultaneity of repetition and reinterpretation.
The quantitative style of deconstruction, with its emphasis on repetition as a gathering of difference which, in itself, is an orientation towards the future, bears a significant resemblance to the form of The quantitative tension between excess and void is exemplified with some force in Jasper Johns' 0 through 9 sketches and paintings -amongst numerous numerically themed works which the artist executed in the early 1960s. By superimposing the numbers 0 through to 9 in various ways, these works interrogate the figuration and configuration of number. The passage between number as an abstract entity and its manifestation in terms of concrete figures, is central to Johns' numerical works. These raise significant questions regarding the transcription of quantity, and the conceptual and representational element of number, either in isolation, or as part of a sequence or equation.
The visual superimposition of these ten numerical figures might at first overwhelm the viewer. This is particularly the case in the paintings, where a kaleidoscopic pattern of bright hues, superficially reminiscent of the Orphist texturing of space, generates considerable work for the viewer in discerning its constituent figures.
More interesting than these painting for the present purpose, however, are the preparatory charcoal sketches which Johns executed (see http://www.moma.org/collection/object.php?object_id=65207). These carry the clear traces of inscription, calling attention to these definite yet fragile markers of style and, symbolically, to the fact that quantity is the subject of an immanent materialism. Lines cross one another repeatedly, some perfectly measured and other roughly sketched, confusing the space contained in individual numerical figures with areas which overlap and lie between these. The way in which these figures are interlocked reflects how their singularity is simultaneously affirmed and compromised. With respect to both the stylistic execution of the work and the ideal series from which it draws its material, a clear sense of which number precedes and which proceeds, which coordinates and which follows, is easily lost in the superimposition of figure and process.
running from 0 through to 9, the order of this count may as easily be nonsequential as it is sequential. Equally, there may be no count at all, the viewer becoming transfixed by a single figure, or intersections where familiar angles and curves seem to promise the materialization of numbers, but which fail to cohere. Much as repetition gathers difference despite the fact that its logic seems to be one of duplication, so too the simple calculation to which Johns refers, is in fact always complicated by the process by which it is counted.
The Uncounted and the Uncountable
Alternating between figures, intersections and interstices, 0 through 9 teases out the tension which exists between unity, seriality and multiplicity. What is perhaps most remarkable about this work, though, is that what escapes calculation is more important than that which is calculable. Derrida refers to this aspect of identity and identification as the remainder. According to Derrida, the remainder "knows of no proper itinerary," 59 resisting incorporation into a sequence, and remaining In Badiou's ontology, nonsummativity -which simultaneously invokes the potential for being subjected to calculation, while resisting final calculation -discovers a paradoxical analogue in forcing. As Badiou conceives it, forcing gives expression both to a mathematical procedure and a type of calculative thought experiment. It rests on the assertion that events, which present decisive disruptions in a given state or situation, give rise to novelty. However, since events are "instaneously vanishing points," novelty cannot be grasped as such: it retains an indiscernible element, 61 which compels us to participate in the constructive process of testifying to the fact that an event has taken place, that novelty emerges, but that this novelty cannot be calculated in full. it stands, they will prove verifiable according to an extension of this situation than can and will exist even though it does not exist as yet." 62 In other words, we are compelled to make decisions in the present, and to imagine situations in which the consequences of these decisions have run their course, in order to come to grips with change both critically and productively, from the midst of a situation which is itself subject constant change.
The work is that since being is constituted by irreducible multiplicity, the proposition even of contingent identity requires that a distinction be made between being itself -inconsistent multiplicity -and existence -or consistent multiplicity. 71 In this light, the void identifies the point at which consistent multiplicity gives way to inconsistent multiplicity, 72 a point which Badiou claims is foundational, since being is nothing other than "multiplicity plucked from the void." In this estimation, calculation is bounded by zero. For Derrida, though, such calculation should be regarded with considerable caution. "E-numeration, like de-nomination, makes and unmakes, joins and dis-members, in one and the same blow, both number and name, delimiting them with borders that ceaselessly accost the borderless, the supernumerary," 75 he suggests. A clearer censure of the idea that being is calculable is hardly imaginable. Yet, it is worth interrogating whether the source of this misgiving is directed at calculation itself, or rather to those calculations which seek to effect an a priori elimination of any remainder. Not unironically, Derrida tends to reduce calculation to an economy -a situation in which number is metonymically substituted in place of qualitative singularities. 76 Thus he is able to argue the case for a vigilant preservation of the "innumerable
[which] does not simply come to exceed or bound the numerical order along its borders, from the outside. It works through it from the inside"
77
.
The physical significance of the lines which exceed the already inexact boundaries of the zero in Johns' sketch take on particular significance at this point. For these lines are nothing other than a concrete manifestation of the remainder. It is now possible to revisit the question posed above, first by extending it -is the remainder, which is uncounted, in fact supernumerary, or uncountable? -and then by answering it -as it manifests through Derrida's style of counting, undoubtedly yes. In 75 "Dissemination," 398. 76 "This relation to the absence of traces, to the innumerable...is constitutive of my 'unity,' my 'unit-ness,' that is, my inscription and my substitution within the series of numbers" (Ibid., 363). 77 Ibid. this sense, Johns' 0 through 9 at once exemplifies and instantiates the point which is so central to the first part of the present work: the aesthetic conditions under which seeming is being.
The artist's style of expression coincides with the style of being of the work in question, returning to the materialism of style by contingently calculating the incalculable, inscribing both number and its remainder. Thus, while Johns' sketch contains a multiplicity of possible numerical sequences, it testifies to its own nonsummativity by resisting any final calculation. This point of resistance -only ever a tentative supplement -is the remainder. Emblematic of Derrida's quantitative logic, the remainder represents an attempt "to think the unique in the plural," 78 and also to disrupt the momentum both of material and temporal calculation. In this sense, the remainder is the mark of persistence, of a patient "waiting for the event," 79 in Gibson's terms. Johns' 0 through 9 poses a difficult challenge in this respect. The imbrication of number and process, the evocation of multiple enumerations from amidst a collagic simultaneity, seems to wait for no one. Yet, finally, this is a work of patient deconstruction, and is emblematic of how every attempt to render being in terms of 
